Arcanepulse

With Russia’s war against Ukraine approaching its fourth anniversary, many lessons can be drawn by South Korea and Japan but arguably the most pertinent one for defense modernization is the pressing need to equip and train their militaries to deal with the impending drone threat from North Korea.

This is salient because Pyongyang and Moscow are allies, with the logical inference that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is certainly learning about the drone capability of Russia, and would emulate and use it against South Korea and Japan.

Additionally, the DPRK will likely learn about and copy the tactical and long-range drones that Ukraine is using, since plenty of debris from such Ukrainian weapons has been strewn across Russia, and Moscow would share gleaned technical intelligence with Pyongyang.

Hence, North Korea might eventually develop analogues of such Ukrainian drones with no compunction about deploying them. Prudence demands that security planners in both the Republic of Korea and Japan adopt defensive measures to manage the probable drone menace from the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA).

Russian drones the North might replicate

The DPRK has adopted reverse-engineered copies of Soviet/Russian short range missiles, anti-ship missiles and other weapons. Thus, it is likely that the Kim regime would replicate the most offensively useful drones in Moscow’s arsenal.

Two of the more prominent examples are the Shaheed-136/Geran-2 one-way attack (OWA) munition and the Zala Lancet loitering munition.

OWA drones are mini cruise missiles with small but damaging warheads which are meant to strike stationary targets on a terminal (one way) flight path. The most prominent of these deployed by Russia against Ukraine is the Shaheed-136 drone imported from Iran, which has recently been made in Russia as the Geran-2. These are guided by onboard inertial navigation systems supplemented by signal receivers using the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system.

The Shahed/Geran travels at 185km/h and has a 50 or 90kg warhead which while of limited use against hardened or underground military facilities, can cause significant damage to civilian infrastructure like schools, hospitals, power stations and the like.

Another key advantage of this OWA drone is it’s range which varies from 650-1500km. This allows the North to potentially blitz all of the ROK with hundreds of Shahed copies, as well as attack many civilian targets in the Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku regions of Japan, with major cities like Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya within range.

As for more immediately impactful short range drones, the Lancet loitering munition comes to mind. While it has a comparatively slower speed of 110km/h and shorter range of 40km, it was intended to orbit the frontlines and strike important targets like armoured vehicles, artillery systems, air defense missile launchers and radars. Its small warhead of about 3kg as well as electro-optical and TV guidance make it well suited to such precision.

As for portability, the Lancet’s light weight of only 12 kilograms means that it can be launched from simple catapults and thus can be issued to smaller army units, increasing its prevalence. In the KPA’s service, Lancet analogues can be used to strike South Korean patrols and defensive positions in the DMZ, as well as vehicles, artillery and sensor arrays.

Moreover, each Lancet only costs about US$35,000 with the Shaheds/Gerans costing around US$30,000-80,000 each. For a sufficiently funded military like the KPA, this is affordable since the damage inflicted would cost far more to South Korea and Japan.

Latest stories

It’s time to revive plans for an Asian Monetary Fund

Central Asia, vanadium and the US National Security Strategy

Trump’s Donroe delusion

Ukrainian drone capabilities Pyongyang could emulate

As for Ukrainian drones, the Kim regime could try to replicate the capabilities of Ukrainian aerial systems even if complete technical copying is not possible. Capability duplication can however be assumed as the North Koreans should have access to material intelligence from drone wreckage shared by Moscow, and the inferred reality that Ukrainian drones are not overly advanced, being products of a wartime economy pressed to manufacture arms expediently, therefore within the North’s manufacturing capabilities.

Beginning with the simplest and shortest range drones adapted from commercial, off the shelf technology, we have first person view (FPV) drones, which are typically small portable drones that can be flown remotely via radio link or attached fiber-optic line. Each drone is equipped with a video camera functioning like the drone’s “eyes,” allowing an operator to pilot the drone like a miniature aircraft.

In Ukrainian service these are ubiquitous, have ranges in the single digits or low 10s of kilometers and have light payload/warhead capability. They are cheap, costing a few thousand US dollars per unit at most, and have been responsible for a large chunk of Russian personnel casualties, vehicle losses and even destroyed tanks and artillery pieces.

With artillery shell scarcity, small short range FPV loitering munitions can even become partial substitutes. If adopted by the KPA, such drones could turn whole sectors of the battlefield into “no go” zones where South Korean troop movements become hampered. Additionally, their economical nature suits an impoverished state such as the DPRK.

Turning to combat drones with longer ranges, a good example is the UJ-26 Bober. The Bober is an OWA drone with an 800km range, a warhead weight of 10-15kg, a $95,000 price tag and a 200km/h top speed, along with its warhead having armor piercing properties that would give the drone limited bunker busting capabilities.

Not much else has been published about the Bober’s technological traits but it was used in successful strikes on Russian occupied Crimea in July 2025 to destroy 3 radars, an air defense system and a parked fighter jet.

Though there is no guarantee that North Korea can produce Bober equivalents at economical scale, the possibility should induce caution in Seoul and Tokyo – for there are a plethora of civilian targets to hit in the ROK and Kyushu, should Pyongyang order a terror bombing campaign.

The third Ukrainian drone development that both Japan and South Korea need to be wary of the North adopting is that of “missile drones” or OWA drones powered with simple jet engines, carrying warheads of about 50kg, travelling at speeds of 700km/h or more, with operationally useful ranges.

This gives the adopting state the ability to attack semi-hardened targets substantially behind the frontlines, while forcing the defender to deploy air defense cannons and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to protect vulnerable or critical installations, diverting them from the frontlines where they are needed to erode enemy air power.

Arguably, one of the more prominent of such “mini-cruise missiles” in Ukraine’s arsenal is the Peklo missile drone. The Peklo is an inertial navigation system (INS) and GPS guided mini-cruise missile with a speed of 700km/h paired with a 700km range

Its functioning altitude is classified but visual sightings imply that it is low flying for the purposes of evading radar detection. It carries a 50kg warhead and has the cost advantage of being priced at less than $200,000 making it rather affordable for what it is.

It has been successfully used on Russian military targets near occupied Luhansk in late 2024, and Russian army command posts in Donetsk in September 2025.

In much the same way as the adoption of Shahed type drones by North Korea poses an acute threat to civilian infrastructure in the ROK and Japan, the introduction of missile-drones like the Peklo would threaten the security of military targets throughout the entirety of South Korea, and the Kyushu, Western Honshu and Shikoku regions of Japan, saturating these areas with cheaply manufactured mini-cruise missiles that peacetime air defenses cannot sufficiently defeat.

Drone defense is essential

As long as the Kim regime might initiate open hostilities, it would be wise for South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense and the Japan Ministry of Defense to plan for and implement counter-drone measures. Considering Ukraine’s struggle, the following measures are both doable and advisable.

Based on implemented strategies, a counter-drone plan consists of small scale/tactical, mid-scale/district based and large-scale/national measures. Firstly, military units and individual soldiers should install or carry drone signal jammers on most vehicles or specialized soldiers respectively, so that an approaching drone’s command signals will be disrupted, reducing the accuracy of loitering munitions.

Concerning offensive means, troops must be issued with shotguns or fragmenting ammunition for their service rifles. In both cases, this allows servicemen to fire a spread of projectiles covering a larger target area, bettering the probability of shooting down a moving drone.

Underpinning these personal or small unit remedies should be new counter drone doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and associated training so that ROK military and police, along with the Japan Self-Defense Force and Japanese National Police can be better equipped to deal with unmanned threats. Civilians should also be educated on how to report suspicious drone sightings and evasion procedures when encountering a loitering munition or OWA drone.

With reference to mid-scale protective ideas, both South Korea and Japan should maintain sufficient stores of used fishing nets or purpose made netting so that transportation routes and field facilities near the DMZ or vulnerable prefectures of Japan can be more resistant against FPV drones or longer ranged loitering munitions. These drones detonate their warheads using impact fuses. Being entangled by barrier nets prevents them from blowing up their targets.

As for kinetic means to defend districts, towns and cities: By shooting down larger drones in the same class as the Shahed, Bober or Peklo, economically sustainable air defense systems need to be employed. These must be affordable, as long range drones are relatively cheap and numerous.

Interception solutions that Seoul and Tokyo could consider using include:

mounting night-vision equipped machine guns on the backs of light trucks sited along predicted drone paths,
flying propeller driven aircraft or helicopters armed with machine guns or other suitable armament, vectored via ground control to intercept OWA drones, and
acquiring more self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAGs). With SPAAGs essentially being rapid fire cannons mounted on armored vehicles, aimed and guided by radar/advanced optical systems and ballistic computers, enabling more feasible destruction of fast but low flying targets, these weapons would more economically eliminate Shahed type and missile-drones, rather than using missiles. As much as budgets allow, more of these SPAAGs should be produced or kept in service.

Lastly, large-scale nationwide protective suggestions include high volume licensed production of affordable drone interceptor models like the Sting and Octopus-100. Interceptor drones are effective as they can be built at scale using 3D printing for some parts, are quite affordable (the Sting costs only US$2100 apiece, far cheaper than Shahed type drones), and have proven efficacy for destroying OWA drones with Shahed-like characteristics.

Moreover, since such interceptors use simpler hardware than dedicated air defense missiles, they require far less complicated launch infrastructure/vehicles, and can thus be deployed to more towns and facilities.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

The Daily Report Start your day right with Asia Times' top stories
AT Weekly Report A weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

Also, since OWA drones fly at low altitudes, making radar early warning much harder, it would behoove both the South Korean and Japanese ministries of defense to get Kyiv to brief them about Ukraine’s network of acoustic sensors, providing advance drone and missile warnings. The “Sky Fortress” system comprises 14,000 acoustic sensors throughout Ukraine. Each sensor, costing between $400 and $1000, can detect the sound signatures of enemy missiles and drones. These then permit defense forces to be placed on the path of the attacks.

Assuming an average cost per sensor of $700, this system would cost only a paltry $9.8 million, affordable for most defense budgets. South Korea and Japan should set up such a detection network as

unlike radars, it cannot be jammed,
is suited for detecting low flying drones and
is effective, helping the Ukrainians intercept 95.24% of incoming drones in one particular attack.

Better to have and not need than to need and not have

The precautionary principle is a risk management approach in which, when an activity poses a potential threat of serious harm to people or the environment and scientific certainty is lacking, those in charge take protective measures to prevent or minimize that harm right away without waiting for conclusive proof.

Similarly, although there is no guarantee that North Korea will acquire asymmetric drone capabilities, the potential for unacceptable harm to civilians and civil infrastructure, along with the possibility that stealthy OWA missile-drones could debilitate South Korean and Japanese defenses, makes the adoption of jammers, drone hunting aircraft, SPAAGs and acoustic detection systems, among other measures, essential for adoption.

Indeed, the cost effectiveness of such precautionary measures, combined with the potential for Pyongyang to field a vast drone force due to their affordability, makes counter-drone preparations logical.

Liang Tuang Nah, PhD, is a research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.